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Abstract In spite of the fact that digital signatures are an essential requirement for
the implementation of e-governance solutions in any organization, its use in
large-scale Government ICT implementation is negligible in India. In order to
understand the reasons for the low-level acceptance of the technology, the au-
thors performed a detailed study of a famous e-governance initiative in India.
The outcome of the study revealed that the reasons are related to the chal-
lenges concerning the use of cryptographic devices carrying private keys and
the complicated process of generating, maintaining, and disposing Digital Si-
gnature Certificates (DSCs). A solution for the challenges understood from the
case study required the implementation of a certificate-less technology, whe-
re private keys should be generated as and when required rather than storing
them on cryptographic devices. Although many solutions exist that provide
certificate-less technology, there have been no practical implementations to da-
te for the use of biometrics in implementing the solution. This paper presents
the first realistic architecture to implement identity-based cryptography with
biometrics using the RSA algorithm. The solution presented in the paper is
capable of providing a certificate-less digital signature technology to the users
where public and private keys are generated on-the-fly.
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1. Introduction
The limited use of digital signatures in governments and the corporate world remains
an anathema in the digital era in which we live. ”Usage of digital signatures across
the world is very limited, theoretically we all should use smart cards, digital signatu-
res, and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for authentication, but practically no one
is willing to use them because of painful implementation procedures and difficulty in
using them,” says Peter Guttman [12]. We took a case-based approach to understan-
ding the reasons for the low-level acceptance of digital signature technology by Indian
government ICT implementations. The motivation of this research is to capture the
challenges faced by end users, understand their needs, and provide a solution that is
easy to use and implement. The results of our study show that the current certificate-
based technology solution provided by PKI to implement digital signature technology
has many limitations (such as the following):
a) It requires procedures for comprehensive management of Digital Signature Cer-
tificates (DSCs).
b) It requires assistance from third parties called Certifying Authorities (CAs) for
creation, revocation, and management of DSCs.
c) Being a weak link in the security of PKI architecture, DSCs are prone to many at-
tacks such as certificate substitution, public key substitution, parameter attacks,
etc.
d) Private keys stored on cryptographic devices are prone to many attacks such as
key separation.
These limitations cause significant roadblocks to the widespread adoption of digi-
tal signatures by governments and organizations across the world. In the course of our
analysis, we inferred that the core issues with PKI are caused by two dependencies
of the present architecture, which causes hindrances in the flexibility of implementing
digital signature technology.
a) Requirement of third party agency or system for generating DSCs and associated
key pairs.
b) Requirement of cryptographic devices for storing and managing private keys.
The challenges related to the dependency on third parties for generating DSCs
was first understood by Shamir in 1984 [23]; he proposed an identity-based public key
cryptosystem (ID-PKS). In his solution, he proposed using a user’s existing public IDs
(such as email addresses, official IDs, etc.) to derive his/her public key and proposed
using a trusted private key generation center (PKG) for generating and distributing
his/her private keys. ID-PKS is an appropriate replacement for the PKI architecture
for closed groups of networks such as a government offices or organizations, where
a limited number of users intend to seek cryptographic services.
Furthermore, to remove the second dependency of the PKI architecture, one
should provide a robust solution for the on-the-fly generation of cryptographic keys.
Cryptographic keys can be generated on-the-fly by using the characteristics of a user
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that are always there with him/her, such as his/her fingerprint, voiceprint, etc. Thus,
the biometrics of a person can be used for the generation of his/her cryptographic
keys that can be generated as and when required, and they need not be stored on any
device. Hence, a combination of the concept of Shamir’s ID-PKS and cryptographic
key generation through biometrics can eliminate the two major dependencies of PKI
discussed above.
Even though ID-PKS seems to be a very promising architecture when compared
to PKI, it has its own inherent limitations (such as the following):
a) There is no robust mechanism for key revocation. Unlike PKI (which uses certi-
ficate revocation lists [CRL]), keys are not stored in DSCs in ID-PKS, as such a
key revocation becomes difficult.
b) Difficulty of message receiver authenticating sender.
c) Difficulty in authentication of users by PKG.
d) Generation and management of user’s private key by PKG, which leads to key
escrow problem.
Immense research efforts over a period of 15 years have provided solutions for re-
moving the limitations of the ID-PKS architecture. To solve the first problem, Boneh
and Franklin proposed a practical implementation of ID-PKS in 2001 that used Weil
pairing and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [5]. They were the first to give the
practical identity-based encryption scheme (IBE) for the revocation problem in ID-
PKS. Thereafter, many researchers proposed solutions for the key revocation problem
[ [3], [21]]. Chen L and Malone Lee J were first to provide a practical solution for the
second problem by introducing an ID-based signcryption scheme, which combined a
digital signature and encryption in one logical step [6]. Currently, the major signcryp-
tion schemes are based on their work and Yuen T H’s blind ID-based signcryption
scheme [28].
Jiang et al. gave a practical solution for the third problem [ [13], [18]] . They used
the user’s fingerprint and ECC to provide a two-party authentication scheme. In 2003,
Boneh and Franklin proposed an approach to alleviate the key escrow problem using
Shamir’s threshold secret sharing [23]. Their approach required distributed PKGs to
be online at all times (in contrast to Shamir’s ID-PKS) in which PKG can be oﬄine
after private key generation. Based on their study, many researchers have provided
solutions to the key escrow problem using secret sharing schemes [ [2], [25]]. Although
the key escrow problem has been mitigated to a great extent, further research is still
desired to find a solution where the load of private key generation can be alleviated
on PKG. Our solution of adding a biometric component where a user will generate
his/her own private key will provide the solution for the fourth and most important
limitation of ID-PKS. There are indeed solutions [ [13], [18]] where biometrics is used
with ID-PKS; however, a solution where biometrics is used for key generation does
not exist.
Moreover, major works in ID-PKS use ECC as the basic algorithm for cryptogra-
phic key generation; however, recent studies have revealed some major disadvantages
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of ECC, such as complexity and patent issues with curves. This has motivated re-
searchers to identify the possibilities of implementing ID-PKS with RSA. Since the
work done in this area is very limited, it is desirable to investigate and identify the
schemes that can implement ID-PKS using RSA as a basic cryptographic algorithm.
This paper proposes how biometrics and ID-PKS can be implemented together using
the RSA algorithm.
Our research intends to provide a practical solution for implementing the identity-
based architecture and biometrics together to resolve the practical limitations in the
existing PKI architecture. This will relate the commonly used unique identity and
biometrics of a person to derive a public-private key pair for the purpose of digitally
signing documents. We have used unique user identification numbers to derive a public
key. The paired private key is derived from the unique features extracted from the
biometric details of the individual.
In the context of the discussion made above, we derive our research problem
as such: ”Combining the concept of identity-based cryptography with biometrics to
derive a practical solution for implementing digital signature technology that will
be used for the on-the-fly generation of public and private keys and implementing
certificate-less digital signatures.”
The main contribution in this paper can be summarized as follows:
a) Practical solution for combining ID-PKS with biometrics using RSA algorithm.
b) On-the-fly generation of user’s private and public keys, which resolves inherent
key escrow problem in ID-PKS architecture.
c) Complete solution to implement certificate-less digital signature technology.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the background and mo-
tivation behind the research; Section 3 explains the existing work done in this area;
Section 4 explains the proposed solution; Section 5 presents the results of the experi-
ments; and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Background and motivation
In order to appreciate the challenges associated with PKI, we decided to take a case-
based approach. As part of this approach, we decided to study a financial management
information system (FMIS) used by a provincial government in India. The case under
consideration is the primary automation tool of the Treasury Department of the
government; it integrates multiple financial institutions & external entities through a
web of custom developed integrations. It is one of the most complex and challenging
e-governance projects ever undertaken in India, making it an apt case to study for this
research. The complexity of the project lies in its focus of fully automating the day-
to-day functionalities of the department, which requires its secure integration with
170+ departments, banks, and other external agencies. Since the intra-departmental
transactions deal with critical data related to the funds of the government, data
security and the non–repudiation of the transmitted data is extremely important.
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The project also envisages the provisioning of Digital Signature Certificates (DSC)
to all of its users (numbering around 75,000) for signing transactions done over the
system. The key challenge here is to generate, maintain, renew, and dispose the DSCs.
Any loss or expiry of a DSC without timely replacement or renewal will put users out
of action for the period until which a replacement arrives. We did a survey among the
employees and stakeholders of the FMIS to identify their perspectives on substituting
manual signatures with digital signatures. The results of the survey clearly explained
the disinterest of the users in accepting the new technology. There were numerous
reasons for the opposition elucidated by those surveyed, but the major finding was
related to the procedural differences that the use of this technology brings between the
traditional way of signing and the modern way of carrying digital signature certificates
(DSC); i.e., holding e-token devices in a pocket. The key challenge pertained to the
generation, maintenance, disposal, and security of DSCs and their carrying devices.
Some fraud related to DSCs was also seen as a matter of concern. A few of the surveyed
people were also worried about the statistics of the National Crime Records Bureau
(NCRB) of India, which states that the cases of obtaining fake digital signatures is
rising across the country year by year. Such challenges prevailing within the digital
signature ecosystem has dissuaded users from accepting DSCs.
The present PKI architecture comes with many minuses, which may cause hin-
drances in the successful implementation and smooth functioning of the department.
Thus, the proposed solution where identity-based cryptography is used to generate
digital signatures on-the-fly is an ideal solution for this department as well as any
other entity/organization that faces such challenges.
3. Literature survey
This paper provides a practical solution for combining ID-PKS and biometrics; thus,
a brief literature review on both topics is given below.
3.1. Identity-based public key cryptosystem (ID-PKS)
In ID-PKS, public keys are generated using each user’s public ID, and a trusted priva-
te key generation center (PKG) generates a private key. ID-PKS was first practically
implemented using bilinear pairing on elliptical curves; since then, ECC has remained
a prominent choice of researchers for implementing ID-PKS. Although RSA is a much
simpler and more popular algorithm, distributing and storing modulus n was a chal-
lenging task that made researchers choose ECC over RSA for ID-PKS. In 2002, Boneh
et al. proposed a solution to implement ID-PKS using mRSA (a modified version of
RSA) and named it Mediated RSA (mRSA) [4]. mRSA is modified RSA algorithm in
which a private key is split into two parts. The user possesses one part, and the other
part is stored on a server called a security mediator (SEM). They were the first to
propose a method for combining mRSA with identity-based cryptography. Later on
in 2003, Ding and Tsudik proposed a slight modification of Boneh et al’s scheme [9].
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In their proposed architecture, they derive a user’s public key from his/her email ad-
dress, using a mapping function known as KG. This function performs a one-to-one
mapping from identity strings to public keys. They use a single common RSA modulus
n for all users, which is made public by storing it in a system-wide certificate.
The most important entity of their architecture is SEM, which they assumed
would not be compromised throughout its lifetime. SEM is conceptualized as an online
semi-trusted server that is responsible for performing the encryption and decryption
of data as well as the revocation of a user’s rights. The two major flaws in their
architecture are the use of a single common RSA modulus n for all users and the
assumption that SEM can never be compromised. In 2013, Elashry et al. presented the
security vulnerabilities of Ding and Tsudik’s scheme and proposed two solutions for
the same [10]. They contradicted Ding and Tsudik’s claim that public keys generated
by a division intractable hash function are also division intractable and proved that
their system can fail under some circumstances.
The PKG or SEM of ID-PKS and IBE hold an important place in the architec-
ture, as they are the single point of trusted contact for private key generation and
distribution. However, having a single trusted authority that is responsible for the
generation and management of private keys leads to the problem of key escrow and
opens the door to many security vulnerabilities. Boneh and Franklin proposed the use
of verifiable secret sharing (VSS) to solve this problem. They used Shamir’s secret
sharing scheme [22] to distribute the master private key of PKG among n PKG nodes
in an (n, t) manner such that a minimum t number of PKG nodes are required to
regenerate the master private key. They were the first to discuss the concept of di-
stributed PKG [2]; thereafter, many researchers have proposed practical applications
using distributed PKG based on Shamir’s secret sharing. In 2010, Kate and Gold-
berg proposed a practical architecture to implement a distributed PKG for use over
the Internet [17]. They combined the concept of proactive secret sharing and forward
secrecy for distributed PKG implementation.
3.2. Cryptographic key generation using biometrics
Biometrics offers a great scope into cryptographic key generation, so there is extensive
work being done in this field. Many sophisticated mechanisms exist to convert finger-
print features to cryptographic keys. Since the proposed solution intends to derive a
binary template from a fingerprint and, consequently, store it on a computer for fur-
ther matching, we need to convert this template into a cancellable template to ensure
security and revocability. Thus, we present a brief review of the work done to derive
cancellable or revocable templates from a fingerprint. The methods used to derive
cancellable or revocable templates from a fingerprint can be broadly divided into ali-
gnment based and non-alignment based. In contrast to non-alignment-based methods,
alignment-based methods align a fingerprint image using the reference minutiae before
further processing. Ratha et al. are among the pioneers in generating alignment-based
non-invertible binary templates from fingerprint data [20]. Their method used three
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non-invertible transform functions Cartesian, Polar, and Surface Folding, which were
performed in a sequence, to generate a non-invertible binary template. Although they
claimed that their transformation functions are non-invertible, Feng et al. [19] proved
that their claim is wrong, even Shin et al. proved that the generated templates from
their method are invertible [24].
In 2005, Ang et al. proposed a method for generating a revocable binary template
from fingerprint minutiae [1]. They derived a binary template from an imaginary
drawn line passing through the core point. The revocation of the template is achieved
by changing the orientation of the line, which varies from 00 to 1800. The orientation
of the line is determined through a transformation function that takes a user’s key
as input. The major drawback of their method is the determination of a core point,
which is not always present in a fingerprint.
In 2009, Jin, Z., et al. proposed an approach for generating secure binary templa-
tes from fingerprint minutiae using random triangle hashing [15]. After translating all
minutiae based on random reference minutia, a binary template is derived from ran-
dom triangles by calculating the number of minutiae contained in it. The performance
of their proposed algorithm is very good, as they could achieve an EER of less than
1%. However, aligning the minutiae on the basis of random reference minutia will
generate a different binary template each time from the same fingerprint. Moreover,
a slight alteration in the reference point considerably affects the overall performance
of the method; the authors did not discuss this issue in their work. They resolved this
issue in a new method proposed in 2012 by generating revocable binary templates
from a fingerprint using polar grid-based transformation and quantization [16].
Contrary to the alignment-based approach, the non-alignment-based approach
does not align fingerprint images using a reference point. In 2007, Song and Beng
proposed a non-alignment-based finger-hashing approach to transform a fingerprint
into discrete binary values (called a finger-hash), which is XORed with a stabilized
fingerprint to obtain a biometric key [26]. Although they used the Solomon and Reed
correction method to stabilize the fluctuation in the value of the finger-hash, there
are practical challenges in generating consistent keys using this method, and their
scheme could not produce longer keys.
In 2012, Conti et al. proposed a mechanism for generating a private key on-the-
fly by fusing fingerprint traits with the RSA algorithm [7]. They proposed storing an
encrypted biometric trait on a smart card and using it for authentication purposes
and the generation of keys. They provided a detailed method for extracting cores and
deltas from a fingerprint image and then using them to generate keys by using the
Log-Gabor approach. Although their experimental results display a very promising
FAR of 0% and FRR of 13.27 %, they are unable to provide robust results depending
only on core and delta features.
In 2014, Wong et al. proposed a multi-scale bag of words paradigm to convert
minutiae set to a bit string [27]. They used a minutiae vector (obtained by converting
a minutiae set to a minutiae descriptor) and generated a codebook from it using a
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histogram approach. This codebook is further used to produce a histogram represen-
ting the input fingerprint. They apply dynamic quantisation to assign more bits to
the discriminative feature components to optimise the FAR and FRR. This process
even helps in improving the entropy of the generated bit string, they have presen-
ted a comparison of the entropies of the bit strings generated by other methods too.
The disadvantage of their method lies in the complexity of generating the bit string.
Furthermore, it lacks the explanation of the cryptographic applications where this
generated key can be used as the key length is short, approximately 420 bits.
4. Proposed solution
Our proposed solution derives the concept of mRSA from Ding and Tsudik’s work [9]
and the concept of distributed PKG from the work of Baek and Zheng [2]. An overview
of the proposed solution is given in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Overview Of Proposed System
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The entities in our solution are the central trusted authority (CTA), sender (S)
and receiver (R). The public and private keys of each entity are represented as follows:
a) CTA :< Mpub,Mpri >
b) S :< Spub, Spri > . The public and private key of S is divided into two parts (user
and CTA) and is represented by < Spub{euser, eCTA}, Spri{duser, dCTA} > .
c) R :< Rpub, Rpri > . The public and private key of R is divided into two parts (user
and CTA) and is represented by < Rpub{euser, eCTA}, Rpri{duser, dCTA} > .
4.1. CTA
A CTA is a secure server that is responsible for the creation of trust in each entity of
the system. Unlike the PKI architecture (where the trust authorities are usually third-
party servers), any secure server or group of servers within the system can be promoted
as a CTA, provided they implement stringent security policies and protocols. The CTA
is the most important entity, as it provides a centralized control for authenticating
users of the system, assisting them during the entire process of encryption, decryption,
and digital signing. Unlike the PKG in ID-PKS that is responsible for the user’s private
key generation and distribution, the CTA will only assist users in providing them with
their partial private and public keys using which user can generate its own private
and public key as and when required.
During the initialization phase, the CTA generates a Master public key and
a Master private key < Mpub,Mpri > . Mpub is stored in a system-wide certificate
and is known to all publicly, while Mpri is a secret key known only to the CTA. To
mitigate the security vulnerabilities related to a single CTA, we propose distributing
Mpri among multiple CTAs using Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [22]. Here, Mpri
is distributed among n CTAs in an (n, t) distributed manner such that a minimum
of k CTA nodes are required to generate Mpri (where k ¡ n).The distributed CTA
approach renders robustness and alleviates the security vulnerability issues related to
a single CTA.
The CTA generates partial private key dCTA for each user and stores it in the
database after encrypting it with Mpub. During the private key generation process,
the partial private key of the user is transmitted to the user using the Diffie-Hellman
(D-H) key exchange algorithm [8]. The user then generates his/her private key by
using the received partial private key.
Holding a user’s partial private key provides a mechanism for CTA to manage re-
voked users. In such a case, if a user’s rights are revoked or his/her authentication fails,
it will not transmit the partial private key to him/her. The CTA is also responsible
for generating and transmitting the user’s public key by using its partial public key.
4.2. Authentication process
There are two types of authentication that would be required within the proposed
system. The first one would involve the CTA authenticating a user and the message
receiver authenticating a sender.
Ea
rly
bir
d
442 Shuchi Dhir, Sumithra Devi K.A.
4.2.1. CTA authenticating a user
User authentication is a very important aspect of any system; while traditional me-
thods of authentication like passwords, OTPs, etc. are proving to be insecure, bio-
metrics remains the most reliable option for authentication. Nevertheless, handling
biometric data is very complex, because it can vary due to several reasons; furthermo-
re, storing biometric data for matching is perilous because, once it is compromised, it
cannot be replaced. Keeping these difficulties in mind, we propose using the biometric
authentication of a user, which would be further enriched using a secure three-way
handshake protocol. The proposed methodology involves using a user’s fingerprint
features as biometric data for authentication. The entire process is divided into two
phases:
User Enrollment: In this phase, a user’s fingerprint features are captured and
converted into unique code UC (a detailed explanation of this process is given in Sub-
section 4.3.1 of this document). This unique code is encrypted by Mpub and stored
by the CTA for future matching. UC is generated using a user-specified token. The
change in token helps in generating a different UC for the user.
F (FingerprintFeatures, UserToken) = UC(seeEquation5).
Function F transforms fingerprint features, and UserToken to UC is a one-way
function. It is nearly impossible to regenerate a user’s fingerprint features from UC .
User Authentication: In this phase, the query fingerprint is converted into UC .
This generated UC is matched with the UC stored by the CTA (a detailed explana-
tion is given in Step 4 of Sub-section 4.3.1). Upon authentication, the CTA generates
a temporary session key and transmits it to the user using a secure three-way hand-
shake protocol. Any data that is transmitted between the CTA and the user upon
authentication is encrypted using the session key.
The three-way handshake protocol for user authentication is explained below.
STEP 1: The user generates temporary session key KS and initiates a connection
request to the CTA by transmitting encrypted query UqC as Mpub (U
q
C ||Ti,KS). The
user encrypts UqC by using the Mpub key and attaches a timestamp value and session
key along with it.
STEP 2: The CTA decrypts the data sent by the user using the Mpri key (Mpri
is generated by contacting k CTA nodes) and matches the UqC sent by the user with
the enrolled UeC stored in the database. Upon matching, the CTA encrypts the partial
private key of the user’s dCTA using KS and transmits it to the user.
STEP 3: Upon receiving the partial private key, the user generates his/her own
private key. A detailed explanation of this process is provided in Sub-section 4.3.2 of
this document.
4.2.2. Message receiver authenticating a sender
An ideal communication scenario where sender S wants to send message m to rece-
iver R is given below:
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a) S generates temporary session key KS . S computes hash of m using function h,
as h (m). S digitally signs h (m) by encrypting h (m) using its private key Spri
as Spri(h(m)). S encrypts digitally signed message including KS using receiver’s
public key Rpub as Rpub (Spri (h(m)|| SUniquePublicID ),KS). S also includes its
unique public id to ensure that the public key that receiver R obtains from the
CTA is respective to that ID. S transmits the encrypted message to R.
b) R can decrypt the message only if:
1) It can decrypt m using its private key Rpri. Thus, S can authenticate that
data reaches the authentic R.
2) R can decrypt m using Spub. R obtains Spub from CTA for SUniquePublicID.
Thus, R can authenticate and non-repudiate S.
c) Upon successful decryption, R obtains session key KS transmitted by S encapsu-
lated in the encrypted message. R uses KS for securing further communication
with S. R generates the hash of m and compares it with the hash sent by S. if
both hashes are the same, R infers that m has not been altered in transit.
4.2.3. Generation of public and private keys using mRSA algorithm from
fingerprint
We convert the features extracted from a user’s fingerprint into a binary template –
we call this unique code UC . UC is a cancellable binary template representation of
the fingerprint data that is used for validating a user’s authenticity during signing
as well as for generating his/her digital signatures. The user’s partial private key is
derived from UC , and the public and private keys are generated from it using the
mRSA algorithm. The entire process is given in detail in the following sub-sections.
4.2.4. Conversion of fingerprint data to unique code UC
UC is a binary template of a user’s fingerprint that carries its unique biometric traits;
and its value is unique for each fingerprint. Each fingerprint image has many local
features (called minutiae) and global features (such as cores, deltas, etc.); these fe-
atures altogether render uniqueness to an individual’s fingerprint. After performing a
series of steps (such as image enhancement, binarization, thinning, etc.), our method
generates a template binary code called UC from the extracted minutiae (local featu-
res). The standards prescribed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) through its fingerprint minutiae viewer (FpMV) has been used for minutiae
extraction (see Figure 2).
The proposed method is comprised of the following steps and is an improvised
version of the method proposed by Jin et al. [14].
STEP 1: Translation and rotation of extracted minutiae based on a eferen-
ce minutia. To produce a rotation and translation invariance, we select a reference
minutia mrand transform the rest of the minutiae on the basis of it. We have not
considered a core point as mr, as a few fingerprints do not have a core point; hence,
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we cannot rely on it. The selection of a reference point is quite critical for the genera-
tion of a binary template from the fingerprint features. Since the features of the same
fingerprint vary from scan to scan, sticking to one reference point will mislead the
results; thus, we propose using M reference points that will generate M binary tem-
plates from the same fingerprint (where M is the total number of minutiae extracted
from the fingerprint).
Figure 2. Screenshot Of FpMV software used for minutiae extraction (local features)
Let us denote mi as the ith minutia extracted from the fingerprint, where mi =
[xi, yi, θi], xi and yi is the position of mi, and θi is its orientation [0, 2pi].We choose
mi as reference minutia mri and transform all other minutiae on the basis of it.
Transformed minutia mti = [(x
t
i, y
t
i , θ
t
i)]is obtained from the following equations:xtiyti
θti
 =
cosθr −sinθr 0sinθr cosθr 0
0 0 1
×
 xi − xr−(yi − yr)
θi − θr
 (1)
After all minutiae are transformed according to Equation 1, they are shifted to
new coordinates using the following equation:
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xniyni
θni
 =
xtiyti
θti
+
WH
0
 (2)
W and H in Equation 2 are the width and height of the new coordinate system,
respectively, and are set to be twice the size of the fingerprint image; this ensures that
mr is located in the center.
STEP 2: Orientation angle-based quantization. We tessellate the new coordina-
te system into equal-sized squares (see Figure 3). The number of squares is determined
experimentally; if we increase this number, we get better results; however, the compu-
tational performance decreases, so we have considered 16 squares in our experiment.
The quantization level is determined by orientation angle θ, whereθ ∈ [0, ...., 360]. The
levels for quantization are determined experimentally, having a too-large or too-small
number of levels can reduce the discriminability of the features.
Figure 3. Screenshot from implemented solution where new coordinate system is tessellated
into equal-sized grids
Mathematically, the histogram generation after quantization is given in Equation
3 as follows:
M =
n∑
i=1
Ci =
N∑
i=1
hi, (3)
where M is the total number of minutiae extracted, n is the total number of squares,
Ci is the ith square, and N is the total number of quantization levels of the orientation
angle.
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For quantizing the minutiae features, we count the number of minutiae in each
square and then place them in predefined equal intervals generated from the orienta-
tion angle. Following this procedure, we obtain n different templates from n squares.
These templates are binarized using the rule given below:
m∑
i=1
= bi =
[
1 ifhi ­ 1,
0 otherwise
]
, (4)
where m is the total number of bits in Ci. Thus, we get n Binary Templates (BT),
which are m bits long, at the end of this step. All n binary templates are concatenated
together to obtain the (n ×m) bit BTi of the ith reference minutia mri . We choose
mi+1 as new reference minutiamri+1 and repeat Equations 1–4 given in Steps 1 and 2.
We repeat the steps until all of the extracted minutiae are used at least once as
reference minutiae to obtain M binary templates from the fingerprint.
STEP 3: UC generation using user-specific tokenized permutation. Storing
the M binary templates directly into the database is not safe, as it reveals the infor-
mation about a user’s fingerprint. We pass M binary templates to a function F , which
transforms the BT and combines them together to generate a UC that is (n×m×M)-
bits long.
UC =
∑
F (BTi, User Token) (5)
STEP 4: Similarity score calculation and matching. M binary templates BT q
are generated from the query fingerprint using Equations 1–5 given above. Each of the
templates in BT q is brute-force matched, with each template stored during enrollment
BT e (see Figure 4).
Figure 4. Comparison between enrolled binary templates and query binary templates
Individual binary templates are derived from UC by applying the reverse func-
tion in Equation 5. Ideally, the binary templates generated from the same reference
minutiae should be same; however, the reference minutiae in the query and enrolled
fingerprints will vary in reality. Thus, we compare each binary template generated
during the query with each one stored during enrollment and calculate a similarity
score. The value of this score ranges from 0 to 1; a value of 1 implies a perfect match.
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We store the similarity-matching scores in two-dimensional array S(i, j) as :
s(i, j) =
(
∑m
k=1BT
q
j,k +
∑m
k=1BT
e
i,k)
∑m
k=1(BT
q
j,k ∧BT ei,k)
(summk=1BT
q
j,k)
2 + (summk=1BT
e
i,k)
2 , (6)
where
∑m
k=1BT
e
i,k and
∑m
k=1BT
q
j,k count the total number of 1’s in the enrolled and
query templates, respectively; they are used in the equation to normalize the matching
score. BT qj,k ∧BT ei,k performs a bitwise AND operation and counts the positions with
values of 1 in both binary templates.
S(i, j) contains the matching scores; to identify the perfect match, we select
the maximum similarity score. We calculate the mean of the maximum distance for
each column in S(i, j) and the maximum distance for each row in S(i, j). We choose
the maximum between the mean column and mean row as our final score. Once the
fingerprints are matched, the CTA derives dCTAfrom UC and transmits it to the user
for private key generation. Figure 5 displays a screenshot of the file that stores the
generated similarity scores.
Figure 5. Screenshot of file storing similarity scores
4.2.5. Generation of public and private keys using unique code UC
and mRSA algorithm
The mRSA algorithm exploits the concept of a threshold cryptosystem. In a threshold
cryptosystem, a certain number of parties are involved in cryptography. Within our
solution, two parties (one user and another CTA) are involved in private and public
key generation.
In the proposed solution, the private key has two parts; one is generated by the
user and known only to him/her, and the other is a user-specific partial private key
generated by the CTA and transmitted secretly to the user. A two-part private key is
required so that a user never digitally signs a document without the CTA knowing this.
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In the proposed solution, the public key also has two parts; the first part is
generated on-the-fly using the user’s public identity, while the second part is generated
during the fingerprint enrollment process and stored in the CTA. Both parts are
generated in such a manner that, whenever a public key is generated by combining
them on-the-fly, it remains relatively prime to φ(n).
The success of the RSA algorithm critically depends upon the selection of two
random prime numbers p and q, as the factorization of large prime numbers ta-
kes a long time. Shkodran (2008) proposed a method for generating these numbers
through a fingerprint and proved that the generated prime numbers have very good
entropy [11].
We use the randomness generated through the fingerprint data as the source
for generating the prime numbers. During fingerprint enrollment, two random prime
numbers (p and q, each of a length of 1024 bits) are derived from UC using a user-
specific secret key. Once p and q are generated from the unique code, the value of n
is calculated as n = p × q. The user distributes the value of n publicly to all of the
nearest neighbors and the CTA; thus, each node maintains a copy of its n neighbors.
Whenever the user changes the value of n, the old value of n is overridden; this ensures
the security of n against any illegal modifications. Upon generation of the random
prime numbers, the public and private keys are generated as given below.
Public Key
In the RSA algorithm, the public key is defined as {e,n}, where e is the public
component, and e is coprime to φ(n) and 1 < e < φ(n). In our solution, this e is split
into two parts: euser and eCTA. The process of public key generation is given below:
a) During fingerprint enrollment, prime random numbers p and q are derived using
the user’s fingerprint features (see Section 4.3). Using the values of p and q, φ(n)
is derived as φ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1).
b) We derive the user part of the public key from a collision resistant function R (x)
as euser = R (user publicID) in such a way that R (x) maps each user identity
to a unique value and for two different public identities (x & y) R(x) 6=R(y).
c) Another part of the user’s public key eCTA that is stored by the CTA is de-
rived using the values of φ(n) and euser in such a manner that gcd (euser +
eCTA, φ(n)) = 1. Thus, the value of eCTA is chosen in such a manner that the
sum of eCTAand euser is relatively prime to φ(n).
d) Once partial public key component eCTA is derived, it is stored in the CTA for
generating the user’s public key as and when required.
e) The values of p, q, and φ(n) are discarded immediately after the user’s fingerprint
enrollment process.
f) Thus, the public key of a user is {(euser + eCTA), n }.
g) Storing eCTAinstead of a public key will ensure that simply changing the user id
can result in a change of the public keys.
Ea
rly
bir
d
Certificate-less digital signature technology for e-Governance solutions 449
Private Key
According to the RSA algorithm, a private key is defined as {d,n}, where d is
the private component, and d = e−1(mod(φ(n)). However, in the mRSA algorithm,
private component d is split into two parts:duser and dCTA. The relationship between
them is given as d = dCTA + dusermodφ(n). The process of private key generation is
given below:
a) The user uses his/her fingerprint to generate UC using Equations 1-5.
b) Using UC , the user calculates the values of p and q and subsequently generates
φ(n).
c) The user requests the CTA to generate and transmit his/her euser+ eCTA and
his/her partial private key dCTA.
d) The user computes his/her part of private key duser using two equations:
d = dcta + dusermodφ(n) (7)
d = e−1(modφ(n)) (8)
e) Subsequently, the private key of the user is derived using { (duser + dCTA), n}.
4.3. Process of signing
The following sequence of steps will take place if S wants to digitally sign message m
and transmit it to R.
a) S requests the CTA for his/her public key and a partial private key.
b) Simultaneously, S computes the duser part of his/her private key using his/her
fingerprint and public component e.
c) The CTA first confirms that S is not revoked and then fetches S’s partial private
key stored in the database, updates it with the current time key, computes dCTA
as dCTA||ti, and transmits it securely (by encrypting it with the session key).
d) S computes his/her private key.
e) S uses the steps mentioned in Section 4.2.2 to digitally sign the data.
5. Experiment results
Our experiments focused on validating the following:
a) There is a one-to-one relationship between a fingerprint and the generated unique
code; i.e., no two fingerprints should generate the same unique code.
b) The entropy of the unique code is very high.
c) The random numbers generated from the unique code have high entropy.
d) There is a one-to-one relationship between the public and private key pair; i.e.,
the data encrypted using the private key can only be decrypted by using its
paired public key and vice versa.
e) No two fingerprints should generate the same set of public-private key pairs.
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Keeping the above points in mind, we performed various experiments to check
the validity of the proposed solution. We implemented the proposed solution in C#.
For experimental purposes, we used public fingerprint databases FVC2002 DB1, DB2,
DB3, and DB4. Each database contains eight impressions per finger from ten different
people; thus, we generated digital signatures for 40 individuals.
The average length of the unique code (in bits) generated for each database is
given in Table 1.
Table 1
Experimental results
S. No
Name of the
DataBase
Average
length
of Uc
(Bits)
Average
metric entropy
of Uc
Average
time taken
for key
generation
Average
FRR
FRR
values (%)
1 FVC2000DB1 10363 0.0001 0.002
FAR:0
FRR:0
2 FVC2000DB2 14780 0.00007 0.001
FAR:0
FRR:0
3 FVC2000DB3 6259 0.00016 0.003
FAR:0
FRR:0
4 FVC2000DB4 8347 0.00012 0.002
FAR:0
FRR:0
Figure 6. Screenshot Of Experiment Table.
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The length of the unique code varies largely because the number of features
collected varies from fingerprint to fingerprint. Similarly, investigating the entropy of
the unique code was necessary because we are using it to render randomness in the
random numbers generated from it. We used Shannon’s Entropy theorem to calculate
the entropy of the unique code; the average entropy value for each database is given
in Table 1. The entropy of the unique code is very high mainly because of fusing
fingerprint features with the 4-bit unique code of the feature lookup table. We also
calculated the metric entropy; its average value for each database is also given in
Table 1. Metric entropy is a measure of the randomness of information. Figure 6
displays the similarity score calculation for the matching unique codes of query and
enrolled fingerprint.
5.1. Security and privacy analysis
It is a well-known fact that systems where cryptographic keys are directly exposed are
more vulnerable to security breaches. Moreover, if the security of the cryptographic
keys, is dependent on the software and hardware which are used to store them, any
small flaw in them can prove disastrous for the security of the entire system.
Our solution has taken these major facts into consideration by implementing the
following:
a) Use of biometric derived key pairs consisting of two-part private and public keys,
with one part stored remotely.
b) Private key generation at the user’s end, which reduces the chance of stealing the
private key during transmission over a network.
c) The entire solution is implemented using asymmetric key cryptography, which
does not require additional security mechanisms for key sharing.
d) A user’s biometric data is not vulnerable because it is not stored on any device
or computer or at the CTA.
e) A user’s private and public keys are generated on-the-fly.
f) Various weak links such as DSC, cryptographic token for storing private keys,
etc. (which are prone to many attacks, as discussed in Section 1) are not found
in our solution.
g) Security of the private key is very high because it is generated on-the-fly.
The following sections provide a case-driven explanation of the security features of
our solution.
Case 1: Consider a malevolent user (A) who intends to modify the digitally
signed communications of another user (B). To achieve this, A has must obtain the
digital signature of B. In order to do so, A needs the fingerprint image of B, which
itself will be difficult to capture and will be prohibitive enough to prevent A from
obtaining B’s digital signature. Assuming that A obtains the fingerprint image of B,
he/she still needs access to the second-factor authentication, that is B’s user token.
This two factor authentication will fail the intentions of the malevolent user.
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Case 2: Assume that a CTA is compromised and A gains access to B’s partial
private key. In this case, the key is of no use to A since it is just a random number
and one part of the private key; he/she cannot generate B’s private key using this
partial component.
Case 3: A performs a sniffing attack during the user authentication process
between B and the CTA. Assume A gains knowledge of B’s encrypted CT ; to decrypt
it, A requires Mpri, which is with the CTA and never shared publicly. Moreover,
A cannot replay this information again at some other time to gain unauthenticated
access, as an encrypted biometric template is generated along with timestamp value
as Mpub (CT ||Ti).
The cases discussed above clearly explain that it is very difficult for any malevo-
lent user to obtain the private key of some other user.
6. Conclusion and future scope
We have proposed a practical solution for combining biometrics with ID-PKS, which
provides complete certificate-less technology for implementing digital signatures. This
study is quite unique since it uses biometrics for the on-the-fly generation of public-
private key pairs using ID-PKS. The uniqueness of our work lies in on-the-fly gene-
ration of public and private keys and, hence, digital signatures. Future work will be
aimed at proposing the security architecture of a CTA.
References
[1] Ang R., Safavi-Naini R., McAven L.: Cancelable key-based fingerprint templates.
In: Australasian conference on information security and privacy, pp. 242–252.
Springer, 2005.
[2] Baek J., Zheng Y.: Identity-based threshold decryption. In: International Work-
shop on Public Key Cryptography, pp. 262–276. Springer, 2004.
[3] Boldyreva A., Goyal V., Kumar V.: Identity-based encryption with efficient re-
vocation. In: Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and commu-
nications security, pp. 417–426. ACM, 2008.
[4] Boneh D., Ding X., Tsudik G.: Identity-based mediated RSA. In: 3rd Workshop
on Information Security Application, Jeju Island, Korea, vol. 12. Citeseer, 2002.
[5] Boneh D., Franklin M.: Identity-based encryption from the Weil pairing. In:
Annual international cryptology conference, pp. 213–229. Springer, 2001.
[6] Chen L., Malone-Lee J.: Improved identity-based signcryption. In: International
Workshop on Public Key Cryptography, pp. 362–379. Springer, 2005.
[7] Conti V., Vitabile S., Sorbello F.: Fingerprint traits and RSA algorithm fusion
technique. In: 2012 Sixth International Conference on Complex, Intelligent, and
Software Intensive Systems, pp. 351–356. IEEE, 2012.
Ea
rly
bir
d
Certificate-less digital signature technology for e-Governance solutions 453
[8] Diffie W., Hellman M.: New directions in cryptography. In: IEEE transactions
on Information Theory, vol. 22(6), pp. 644–654, 1976.
[9] Ding X., Tsudik G.: Simple identity-based cryptography with mediated RSA. In:
Cryptographers’ Track at the RSA Conference, pp. 193–210. Springer, 2003.
[10] Elashry I., Mu Y., Susilo W.: Identity-based mediated RSA revisited. In: 2013
12th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Compu-
ting and Communications, pp. 728–735. IEEE, 2013.
[11] Gerguri S.: Biometrics used for random number generation. Ph.D. thesis, Masa-
rykova univerzita, Fakulta informatiky, 2008.
[12] Gutmann P.: Engineering security. In: , 2013.
[13] JIANG W.q., HUANG Z.q., YANG Y.x., Jie T., Liang L.: ID-based authentica-
tion scheme combined with identity-based encryption with fingerprint hashing. In:
The Journal of China Universities of Posts and Telecommunications, vol. 15(4),
pp. 75–120, 2008.
[14] Jin Z., Ong T.S., Tee C., Teoh A.B.J.: Generating revocable fingerprint template
using polar grid based 3-tuple quantization technique. In: 2011 IEEE 54th In-
ternational Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS), pp. 1–4.
IEEE, 2011.
[15] Jin Z., Teoh A.B.J., Ong T.S., Tee C.: Secure minutiae-based fingerprint templa-
tes using random triangle hashing. In: International Visual Informatics Confe-
rence, pp. 521–531. Springer, 2009.
[16] Jin Z., Teoh A.B.J., Ong T.S., Tee C.: Fingerprint template protection with
minutiae-based bit-string for security and privacy preserving. In: Expert systems
with applications, vol. 39(6), pp. 6157–6167, 2012.
[17] Kate A., Goldberg I.: Distributed private-key generators for identity-based cryp-
tography. In: International Conference on Security and Cryptography for Ne-
tworks, pp. 436–453. Springer, 2010.
[18] Li L., Jiang W.Q., Tian J., Yang Y.X., Jiang C.P., Wu Z., Yang X.: A networking
identity authentication scheme combining fingerprint coding and identity based
encryption. In: 2007 IEEE Intelligence and Security Informatics, pp. 129–132.
IEEE, 2007.
[19] Quan F., Fei S., Anni C., Feifei Z.: Cracking cancelable fingerprint template of
Ratha. In: 2008 International Symposium on Computer Science and Computa-
tional Technology, vol. 2, pp. 572–575. IEEE, 2008.
[20] Ratha N.K., Chikkerur S., Connell J.H., Bolle R.M.: Generating cancelable fin-
gerprint templates. In: IEEE Transactions on pattern analysis and machine in-
telligence, vol. 29(4), pp. 561–572, 2007.
Ea
rly
bir
d
454 Shuchi Dhir, Sumithra Devi K.A.
[21] Seo J.H., Emura K.: Revocable identity-based encryption revisited: Security mo-
del and construction. In: International Workshop on Public Key Cryptography,
pp. 216–234. Springer, 2013.
[22] Shamir A.: How to share a secret. In: Communications of the ACM, vol. 22(11),
pp. 612–613, 1979.
[23] Shamir A.: Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes. In: Workshop
on the theory and application of cryptographic techniques, pp. 47–53. Springer,
1984.
[24] Shin S.W., Lee M.K., Moon D., Moon K.: Dictionary attack on functional
transform-based cancelable fingerprint templates. In: ETRI journal, vol. 31(5),
pp. 628–630, 2009.
[25] Susilo W., Guo F., Mu Y.: Efficient dynamic threshold identity-based encryption
with constant-size ciphertext. In: Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 609, pp.
49–59, 2016.
[26] Thian Song O., Teoh Beng Jin A., Connie T.: Personalized biometric key using
fingerprint biometrics. In: Information Management & Computer Security,
vol. 15(4), pp. 313–328, 2007.
[27] Wong W.J., Wong M.D., Kho Y.H., Beng A., Teoh J.: Minutiae set to bit-string
conversion using multi-scale bag-of-words paradigm. In: 2014 IEEE International
Workshop on Information Forensics and Security (WIFS), pp. 1–6. IEEE, 2014.
[28] Yuen T.H., Wei V.K.: Fast and proven secure blind identity-based signcryption
from pairings. In: Cryptographers’ Track at the RSA Conference, pp. 305–322.
Springer, 2005.
Affiliations
Shuchi Dhir
Research Scholar, Bharathiar University, Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu, India, e-mail:
shuchi23_dhir@yahoo.com, ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8780-011X
Sumithra Devi K.A.
Dean(Academics), Dayananda Sagar Academy of Technology and Management, Bangalore,
India. e-mail: sumithraka@gmail.com
Received: 12.02.2019
Revised: 16.09.2019
Accepted: 16.09.2019
